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It a California Senate Select Committee
hearing about the entertainment industry held in
the fall of 2002, representatives from various music
industry positions came together to express their
views on problems plaguing the industry.2 Music
attorney Don Engel, speaking on behalf of artists,
described record industry accounting practices as
"intentionally fraudulent," comparing record
companies to Enron and WorldCom' At the hearing,
one artist's representative went so far as to accuse
the record companies of running a continuing
criminal enterprise.4 While most artists did not go
this far,they did express distrust in record companies
and the system under which they operate.' Many
artists see themselves as victims of a system designed
to keep them perpetually indebted to record
companies who own the product of their labor.'
While some artists expressed gratitude for the initial
investments made by the record companies in their
talent, they complained about feeling cheated by
companies due to their small share of the proceeds
when the gamble pays off for the labels.7
This type of distrust and discontent led to
the formation of groups such as the RecordingArtists
Coalition ("RAC"). The RAC is a nonprofit, nonpartisan coalition formed to represent the interests
of recording artists whenever label and artists'
interests conflict with regard to legislative issues, and
to address other public policy debates affecting the
music industry. This coalition of vocal performers
and acts has more than 150 diverse members and is
growing.' Among the names on the group's diverse
roster are Bruce Springsteen, Sting, R.E.M., Bonnie
Raitt, Madonna, Eric Clapton, Dave Matthews, Billy
Joel, Elton John, Linkin Park, No Doubt, Christina

Aguilera,the Dixie Chicks, and Kenny Rogers. 9 With
politicians, lawyers, and managers on their side, the
RAC artists have been receiving the attention of
lawmakers over issues such as the length of recording
contracts, copyright ownership, accounting practices,
payola, and health benefits for artists. 0 In addition
to lobbying the legislature, RAC members are also
taking their labels to court in furtherance of their
cause. Courtney Love, for example, filed suit to be
released from her recording contract.'! The Dixie
Chicks, in their counter-suit against Sony, charged
the label with committing "systematic thievery" to
cheat them out of royalties.'2 Artist's concerted
efforts over the past few years to lobby state
legislatures and Congress and to battle their labels
in the courtroom has become known as the Artist
Rights Movement.
The major record labels-Universal, Sony,
Time Warner, EMI/Virgin and Bertelsmannrepresented by a powerful trade group, the
Recording IndustryAssociation ofAmerica ("RIAA"),
disagree with the accusations of the RAC. The record
companies instead feel that they are the victims.
Industry studies point out that for every hit the
business scores, it loses $6.3 million on albums that
do not make it.' 3 Fewer than five percent of signed
artists ever deliver a hit.' 4 This is a huge financial
risk. Labels are insulted that after making multimillion dollar investments in artists, very few of which
actually pay off, they are then "held hostage" by the
successful few.'" They claim they are forced to pay
large advances and give in to the whims of artists
who make millions, yet complain that they are
oppressed. 6 They protest that artists should be

helping fight the real
enemy of digital piracy,
instead of accusing
record companies of
thievery. 7
Undoubtedly,
dysfunction exists in the
relationship between
record labels and
recording artists. In
describing the situation,
California State Senator
Kevin Murray said,"[i]t is
as if one spouse began secretly moving assets in order
to benefit him or herself to the detriment of the
other spouse. Upon discovery, it isbound to generate
resentment, anger and possibly revolt" I Artists and
labels, like the spouses in Senator Murray's analogy,
undoubtedly work best when working together. As
Senator Murray points out, "one of the most
significant issues istrust. In the case of artist related
issues, the artists and the record companies are
supposed to be allies and partners."' 9
All of this dissension comes at a time when
the recording industry isfaced with what some might
call a crisis-record sales are down and music piracy
is widespread and growing. The fact is,artists and
record companies need each other, especially now.
The artists need the record companies to invest in
and market their music." Record companies need
artists to make music and act as their allies in fighting
piracy and determining the best business models and
formats to deal with new technology-related
challenges.2 As former RIAA chief Hilary Rosen has
pointed out,"[w]e want to resolve our disagreements
and move on to other critical matters, especially
22
piracy.We're on the same side in 99% of the issues."
Of the one percent of the issues on which
artists and record companies find themselves on
opposing sides, record label accounting practices is
one of the most debated. Despite all the talk, not
much headway has been made toward solving the
problem--either in legislatures or in courts-at least
not in a way that affects the industry as a whole.3
As Greg Hessinger, director of the American
Federation ofTelevision and RadioArtists ("AFTRA"),
has explained, "changes must be implemented that
provide for greater transparency and a fuller duty
to account so that artists can at least be certain that
they are being paid correctly."24 In his opinion, the
industry needs to address the problem of flawed

accounting practices now, before the industry can
focus on long-term solutions to other problems it
faces.2
The purpose of this note is to examine the
legal causes and consequences of what many
consider poor label accounting practices, and to
propose a solution: imposing a duty on record labels
to correctly and transparently collect and distribute
artist royalties. If labels operate under a fiduciary
duty to their artists when receiving and paying
royalties, artists will get paid what they are due. If
they are not, artists will have viable remedies available
to them-remedies that create an incentive for labels
to make positive changes in the way they handle
royalty accounting. This will, in turn, work to repair
the relationship between artists and labels and
restore trust where distrust is rampant. Once
recording artists and their labels are able to resolve
their differences on issues such as accounting
practices, the two can work together in facing the
many pertinent problems plaguing the music industry
today.

In order to fully examine the relationship
between artists and labels, and their accounting

best, on the
practices, it is imperative to have an understanding made through the record label, or at
terms.
label's
record
of the key provisions of a recording agreement. The
recording contract is considered the hub around
(2) Term
which nearly every aspect of the music industry6
The "term" of the recording agreement
revolves, and royalty accounting is no exception.1
the amount of time the artist will be under
indicates
Virtually every material provision in a music industry
exclusive contract with
the record company.3"
Normally, the term of
the agreement consists
t Iof an initial period with
multiple, successive
options.3 The record
company can exercise
one or all of these
options in its sole
discretion, requiring the
record
to
artist
additional albums. 4 The
number of option
ranges from
agreement, particularly those relating to the artist's periods for3a new artist on a major label
initial term and each option
compensation and the term of the agreement, are six to eight. During the
a specific number of
create
27
must
artist
the
period,
The fundamentals of the
complex.
extremely
relationship between artists and labels contain a
complexity of issues unlike those of any other type
of business relationship.28 For example, the typical
recording agreement contains complicated advance
payment structures and extensive royalty provisions
that require an expert to decipher and to determine
29
the amount of royalties due from record sales.
Because of these complexities and because the
agreements are often close to one hundred pages
long, the description below of the key elements of a
recording contract are meant only to give a cursory
understanding of what is typically involved in such
agreements. Included here are descriptions of key
provisions, including Exclusivity, Term, Advances,
Recording Costs, and Royalties, as well as
commentary on how these standard contract
provisions affect the debate over royalty accounting.

ten individual master recordings.3 7 The artist must
also give the record company rights in a number of
items including the master tapes, all original session
tapes, mechanical license information, sample licenses,
8
artwork, jacket copy information, and credits. If
the artist fails to deliver any of these items, the term
of the agreement is suspended until proper delivery
is completed, meaning that time stops ticking on the
length of the agreement's term until all the
requirements are fulfilled. 9 So, when a new artist
signs a recording agreement, they begin a relationship
that will continue through the following six to eight
albums of their creative career (unless the label
decides to let them go instead of exercising an
option). During this time, artists are under the
control of the label. This is no small commitment.

(I) Exclusivity

(3) Royalties

Under a recording agreement, the recording
artist's activities in every arena of the record industry
are granted exclusively to the record company during
the length of the contract's term. This means that
the artist typically cannot perform as a featured artist
on other artists' records or a soundtrack album."
Because of the Exclusivity Clause, the artist is locked
in-if money is to be made by the artist, it will be

Artist royalties are based on record sales,
and are calculated as a percentage of the selling
price. 4 The percentage may be based on the
Suggested Retail List Price ("SRLP") or on the

albums.3 6 Each album usually must contain at least

wholesale price of the album. 4 Almost all major

labels use the SRLP to calculate royalties.42 Royalty
rates for new artists in the United States range from
43
eleven to thirteen percent of the SRLP. The royalty

rate for a more established artist ranges from sixteen

to eighteen percent, and may be as much as eighteen
to twenty-one percent of the SRLP for a very

(b) Sample Royalty Calculation"8

44
successful artist.

(a) Royalty Deductions
The artist's royalty is not a percentage of
the entire SRLP generated on an album. Instead,
certain deductions and reductions will affect the
retail or wholesale price, in order to determine the
royalty base. 4 For example, the SRLP may be reduced
by a"container" charge or"packaging deduction" of
25 percent.46 The deduction is meant to recover
the costs associated with the physical packaging of
47
the CD-the jewel case, printing, and liner notes.
The actual cost of the packaging is usually significantly

'SLRP" - Retail List Price (for a CD)

$15.98

Container Charge (25% of retail)

($4.00)

Subtotal #1

$11.98

Free Goods Adjustment (I5%)

($1.80)

Actual Revenue Basis

$10.18

Total Artist Royalty Rate (I1%)

$1.12

Producer Royalty (30%)

$0.34

48
less than what the record company deducts.

Final NetArtist Royalty
$0.78
Ironically,the packaging deduction is still applied even
for sales via the Internet, when no physical packaging
is needed.49 In addition to this packaging deduction,
(4) Recoupment of Advances
the contract may also call for deductions for free or
and Recording Costs
promotional goods, and reductions for CDs sold
outside the United States, through record clubs or
While it is the record company who initially
non-traditional formats (such as DVD, enhanced CD, pays recording costs for each album's production, as
CD-ROM, or minidisk.)"0 Often the artist's royalty well as advances paid to the artist for living expenses
rate is cut in half for sales in military bases, foreign during the recording process, ultimately the individual
territories, or record clubs-regardless of whether artist bears these costs.5 9 Usually the contract
or not the label is earning less from these sales.
dictates the establishment of a recording fund as a
Although it is becoming more common to means of covering costs. 0 This fund is intended to
base royalty calculations on 100 percent of records cover both the recording costs and compensation
sold, some contracts still call for an across the board to the artist for a particular album. 6' The entire
deduction in the amount of sales used in calculating recording fund is recoupable by the record company
royalties--generally 10-15 percent.5 ' This means that directly from the artist's future royalties from album
the artist will only receive royalties from 85-90 sales. 62 At least half of the costs of videos and other
percent of the records they sell.52 The original major promotional costs are also taken from the
purpose of this deduction was to make up for the artist's portion of royalties.6 3 Recoupment of
number of vinyl records that would break during recording costs is cross-collateralized among all of
manufacturing or shipping and could not be sold. 3 the albums that the artist records under the entire
Some contracts still call for this deduction even agreement.6 4 This means that any unrecouped
though modern methods of manufacturing records amount payable to a record company in connection
have virtually eliminated the problem of breakage. 4 with one album may be collected from royalties
Although none of these deductions directly reflect earned by any of the artist's previous or future
actual costs incurred by the record company, they albums. 6 If an artist's first album is only moderately
traditionally remain in standard royalty calculations.5 successful, but a subsequent album earns a great deal
Some view these deductions as inappropriate and of royalties, the artist will not be paid anything until
arbitrary.5 6 Regardless, the deductions are not the record label has been reimbursed for monies
generally something a new artist can easily negotiate paid to the recording fund for both the first album
his or her way out of, even if they know enough to and the second album. The purpose of this policy is
do so. The smaller the royalties the record company to use the artist's success at one time to protect
ultimately pays the artist, the larger the record against any previous or future losses.66
57
Based on the royalty rates given in the
company's profit.
example above of a Sample Royalty Calculation, the

album may have to reach Gold (500,000 copies sold)
or Platinum (1,000,000 copies sold) status before
the label isable to recoup recording costs, advances,
video costs, radio promotion costs, and tour support,
and actually pay the artist any royalties. 7 This is,of
course, assuming that nothing is underreported or
under calculated.
Complaints about the structure of royalty
recoupment provisions in artist contracts, which
dictate that major costs including the costs of
recording the record are recouped against the artist's
royalties, are among the primary criticisms made by

earned, charges have not accrued, or the artist does
not specifically request one. 76 The recording contract
will also usually state that if the artist does not file
notice of an audit or claim within two years of the
date of the royalty statement, then they are forever
foreclosed from challenging the accuracy of that
statement.77 If an artist decides to audit, he or she
will usually have to object to the royalty statement
within the prescribed time limits and give advance
notice of the audit to the record company, usually at
least 30 days before the auditors intend to
commence the audit.78 The record company can

artists. 68 Those that believe the recoupment policies

usually postpone the audit at least once. 79 For

in the standard recording agreement are arduous
note that the majority of recording artists will never
achieve financial success or independence because
of the standard industry recoupment policies.
Courtney Love, a
member of the RAC,
believes that"the system

example, the contract might allow the record
company to postpone an audit for two months if it
gives the artist 10 days notice prior to the scheduled
commencement date.80 The amount of time the audit

is set up so that almost

a

no one gets paid. '69 She
notes, in her article
entitled "Courtney Love

Does the Math" that as
a result of the current
system, a record label
can make $6.6 million in

b

__

n
b'

profits, while the band
breaks up because it still
n
carries $2 million in
debt.70 For a moderately
successful record, the
record company makes the upfront investment and
takes the financial risk, but the artist actually pays

may last may also be limited by the terms of the
contract, as well as restrictions on what auditors
for most of the costs. 7' Artists view this situation as can examine, when they may conduct the audit, and
innately unfair, especially when they consider that who the auditors may be.8 It has long been the
they sign ownership rights in their master recordings policy of most labels, for example, to limit audits to
over to labels.7 2 Chairman Hatch has stated,"[the the company's royalty statements only, disallowing
music industry] is the only industry in which, after auditors from accessing any manufacturing
you pay off the mortgage, the bank still owns the documents.8 2
house ' 73 No other industry with royalty artists
For an artist who has a steady but modest
74
operates this way.
stream of record sales, the investment of hiring an
auditor on retainer will be too high to justify doing
(5) Royalty Accounting and
so, especially since most contract clauses prevent
Auditing
multiple artists from sharing the cost of the audits.
Royalty payments and statements to artists Therefore, such an artist may never be paid what he
are made twice a year.7" The contract will usually or she isdue.While a few successful artists can afford
require a royalty statement to accompany each to audit and find out where discrepancies exist,
payment, with some contracts providing that a record companies are making an opportunistic profit
statement can be withheld if no royalties have been

off of the 95 percent of artists who cannot or do
not audit.83
The purpose of an audit is to produce
confidence in the royalty recipients that they are
being accounted to properly by allowing them to
check the figures they are being provided.84 If, as is
the case in the recording industry,the right to audit
is severely limited, then it cannot serve the purpose
of instilling confidence and good will.85

wrongdoing. 89 California State Senator Kevin Murray

commented, "I was reminded of the tobacco
executives standing in front of Congress and swearing
that they did not believe tobacco was harmful to
ones [sic] health."' 90 Audits routinely detect unpaid
royalties, and it is estimated that labels misreport or
underpay artist royalties by 10 to 40 percent.9
In response to accusations that record labels
treat their artists unfairly, the RIAA emphasizes the
contracts artists sign are negotiated on their behalf
I
~
- 1
by very skilled lawyers who would not have their
Although many of the provisions in the clients sign poor contracts.92 The RIAA has done
standard recording agreement seem to favor record studies which show that only one of 244 contracts
labels at the expense of artists, such provisions might signed from 1994-96 was negotiated without the
be tolerable if artists could at least be certain that artist's legal counsel.93 However, according to
what their contracts entitle them to is what they attorneys who represent artists, even top artists do
are getting. Unfortunately, under current industry not have the sway to negotiate and change a contract
accounting practices artists are not getting paid what offered when utilizing the best legal assistance
they are due, record companies are not taking available.94 Considering that the five major recording
responsibility, and there are virtually no penalties industry conglomerates release more than 90
for labels when they keep more than their share.
percent of commercial music, an artist is not left
with much of a choice.9 They must either sign the
(I) Artists are not Getting
contract substantially as offered, or give up the hope
Their Fair Share
of a career as a music artist supported by a label.9 '
During the recent legislative hearings held Not surprisingly, most choose to sign. This inability
by the California Senate, it was clear that artists to negotiate a more favorable deal up-front leaves
suspect they are being systematically cheated out of artists with a bitter taste in their mouths when they
their royalties.86 They believe that after they sign do not receive what they are entitled to under their
contracts that unavoidably favor the record company, contracts.
they are not paid the royalties they are due under
The labels assert that artists are getting paid
the contract.8 7 During the legislative hearings, properly. However, artists' auditors say that nearly
auditors claimed that virtually all royalty statements all audits find underpayments.97 Sadly, there are huge
numbers of artists
whose royalties are
significant, but not
significant enough that
u ethey can afford to pay
the minimum $15,000
retainer required to

- d

initiate an audit.98 And

even if artists do audit,
Stheir

under report royalties due to artists.88 When
confronted by these accusations, representatives
from all five major record conglomerates denied any

contracts require

them to go to court in
order to be paid what is
due. Because of this,
artists will generally
settle for much less than
what they are due.
Either way, artists are frequently left with less than
what their contract entitles them to receive.

Senator Murray believes there is at the least goes unnoticed, record labels are in essence
purposeful neglect on the part of record company rewarded by keeping the monies owed to artists.
accounting departments.99 When questioned at the
last California Senate hearing on the matter, royalty
accountants at record companies admitted that there
are "royalty policies" which often override the
provisions of an artist's contact, and that these
policies favor the record company more than the
artists. 00 It seems record companies have traded
away accurate royalty accounting to artists for
operational efficiency in their accounting
Artists who sue their record labels usually
departments.'
lose on the pleadings because it is difficult to establish
their claims. Those that do not lose on the pleadings
(2) Record Companies are not
usually settle with their record company.'0° While a
being Penalized
settlement may benefit that particular artist, it does
Record contracts essentially bar any not help the industry problem as a whole.0 6 Record
penalties for underpaying royalties. Generally, companies can continue current practices until an
contracts include a clause that prevents the company artist gains enough bargaining power to threaten the
from being liable for more than the amount of status quo. Even if an artist wins a suit and is able to
royalties due, no matter what their behavior.0 2 These receive damages for the amount of royalties they
clauses instruct that a court must determine the have missed out on, he or she is still bound to an
agreement with a party
Swhom

*
,r

t
c

com any
-"or

amount due, and give labels a chance to pay up before
the company is in breach of their contract.'0 3 Unless
an artist can prove specific intent to commit fraud
(which is very difficult to prove), labels will never be
liable for breach of contract arising out of royalty
payments. 4 Consequently, record companies can
be purposefully negligent without penalty, while
artists lose out. If record companies do get caught
underpaying royalties and an artist takes them to
court, there is no penalty. At most, a court will force
the company to turn over at least a portion of what
was due to the artist anyway. If the underpayment

the artist feels has

been acting fraudulently.
In attempting to break
the
from
free
relationship with their
labels, artists have tried
various legal theories,
including: fraudulent
inducement to contract,
breach of contract,
violation of RICO; unjust
enrichment, and breach
of the covenant of good

faith and dealing. These
have been met with
limited success.
Several of these claims were pleaded in the
course of the Dixie Chicks' battle with Sony in
2002. '07 The Dixie Chicks entered into a recording
contract with Sony in 1997, which required the Dixie
Chicks to deliver to Sony, at Sony's option, up to six
albums.0 8 The group claimed that Sony engaged in a
scheme to deprive them of millions of dollars in
royalties and tried to extract an extra album from
them. 9 After repeated attempts to complete an
audit and resolve the disputes, the Dixie Chicks, in a
letter to Sony dated July 13, 2001, purportedly
terminated the Recording Agreement, asserting that
Sony had "fraudulently induced" the Dixie Chicks

into entering the contract, and had issued "false and
fraudulent royalty statements."' 10They also alleged,
"Sony applied its institutional policies and practices
to engage in a pervasive, systematic and intentional
scheme to under-account and deprive them of
millions of dollars they were entitled to receive."'I
Sony commenced an action seeking a declaratory
judgment and an injunction." 2 In their counterclaim,
the Dixie Chicks claimed breach of contract, fraud,
3
and violation of RICO."
One of the Dixie Chicks' theories was that
Sony fraudulently induced them to enter into their
recording contract.' 4 To support a claim for fraud
where a contract exists, a party must demonstrate
a fraudulent misrepresentation collateral or
extraneous to the contract.' 5 Fraud in the
inducement to contract can be supported by a false
statement of present fact, or a false statement of
future intent which concerns a matter collateral to
a contract between the parties.I6 The group based
their claim for fraudulent inducement on Sony's
alleged intention not to perform the contract at the
time it was created.' ' Specifically,they alleged,"prior
to the execution of the recording agreement, Sony
represented to the Dixie Chicks that it would render
timely, accurate and honest accountings, would pay
all amounts due them and would permit them to
conduct meaningful audits to ascertain the accuracy
of its accountings, which representations were
known to Sony to be false at the time"' I"The New
York court, however, held that a contractual promise
made with the undisclosed intention not to perform
it does not constitute fraud." 9 Because the promises
Sony made regarding accountings, payments, and
audits were consistent with the express terms of
the Recording Contract, they could not be the basis
for a fraud claim.' 20 Interestingly, if the court had
recognized a fiduciary duty by Sony on behalf of the
Dixie Chicks for royalty accounting, the Dixie Chicks
might have been able to get out of their contract
under a fraudulent inducement theory because the
fiduciary duty would have existed beyond the duty
2
to perform under the contract. '
The Dixie Chicks had similar luck on their
other claims. Their RICO claim, for example, was
22
dismissed during the early stages of the litigation.
Their claim was that Sony was involved in
racketeering activity in the form of mail and wire
fraud by sending a series of royalty statements
through the mail which knowingly understated
amounts due from Sony to the Dixie Chicks. 23

Unfortunately, without the ability to perform a
proper audit of Sony's records, the group could not
give the court the specific dates and details of the
mail fraud in order to survive a Rule 9(b) motion. 24
This case is one example of the difficulties artists
face when trying to recover their royalties in court.
When all they have to depend on is the contract
itself and they cannot perform the type of audit
necessary to gather the information needed to plead
their claims (if they can afford an audit at all), it is
not easy for an artist to do much when they suspect
their label has been withholding royalties.

Making the duty to pay royalties a fiduciary
duty essentially means that the artist would have a
moral right, in addition to the contractual right, to
receive fair and accurate royalty statements and
would have additional remedies available to them to
enforce their rights.a

Fiduciary duty is a product of social policy,
designed to regulate opportunism and its effect of
creating abuses of trust or confidence 26 When a
person undertakes to act for another, he or she will

often be exposed to opportunities to benefit himself
or herself. 2 7 Because of this temptation, the actor
might divert value from their beneficiary or arrange
to receive a concurrent benefit. 2 Social policy
dictates that this type of behavior be restricted
where the beneficiary has not granted his or her
fully informed consent. 29 Because opportunism
seems to come naturally in certain situations, the
fiduciary constraint is a strict one.o
Fiduciary duty is a broad term and courts
are careful not to define particular instances of
fiduciary relations in such a way as to exclude other
and new cases. 3 ' It is not mandatory that a fiduciary
relationship be formalized in writing. 32 The ongoing

conduct between the parties may create a fiduciary additional factors are necessary to convert a
relationship that court will recognize.'33 Fiduciary conventional business relationship into a fiduciary
duties arise as a matter of law in formal relationships relationship. 4 A"simple contract" does not create
34
46
such as attorney-client, partnership, and trustee.
a fiduciary relationship giving rise to special duties.
However, its operation is
not limited to the
dealings and transactions
between these formal
relationships. 3 ' The duty
extends to all relations
in which confidence is

M-

d t

rested, and in which
dominion and influence
resulting from this
confidence can be
exercised by one person
over another' 3 6 A
fiduciary relationship
h
f
generally arises when
there is an unequal
relationship between the
parties-the party entrusting the confidence must
be in a position of inequality, dependence, weakness
or lack knowledge.' 37 Broadly speaking, a fiduciary
relationship is one founded on trust or confidence,
where one party depends on the integrity and fidelity
of another.38
A new fiduciary relationship will not be
created lightly since it imposes extraordinary duties
and requires the fiduciary to put the interests of the
beneficiary ahead of its own if necessary. 9 Once
such a relationship is established, the law provides
that neither party may exert influence or pressure
on the other, take selfish advantage of his trust or
deal with the subject matter of the trust in such a
way as to benefit himself or prejudice the otherexcept in the exercise of utmost good faith. 40
Normally, contractual relationships are not
subject to fiduciary duties, primarily because parties
to contracts have other remedies. Additionally, it is
commonly asserted that fiduciary responsibilities
have little to do with commercial relations.' 4'
However,contractual commercial relationships often
give rise to fiduciary duties. 42 Some argue, in fact,
that fiduciary obligation properly applies to the entire
commercial sphere.'43 This would happen, for
example, in a circumstance where one party has sole
control over the information necessary to determine
if there has been a breach of contract. 44
While it is not entirely clear when fiduciary
duties arise out of a contractual relationship,

However, the distinction between contract and
fiduciary relations has no readily discernable
definition.'47 Since fiduciary duties are based on
principles of equity and fairness, courts have refused
to define precise parameters and circumstances from
which they arise.

48

Nevertheless, courts have

consistently examined several factors when
distinguishing between an every day contractual
relationship and afiduciary relationship: (I) the trust
or confidence existing between the parties, (2)
superiority, influence, or control by one party over
another as a result of the relationship, and (3) other
49
special facts indicating a need for special duties.

The facts and circumstances surrounding
royalty accounting, collection, and distribution by
record labels on behalf of their artists suggest that
the fiduciary relationship is applicable. California
Senator Kevin Murray worked as an agent before he
became a senator and is,therefore, very familiar with
the working relationship between artists and labels.
When describing the relationship, he has used the
analogy of a husband and wife, (rather than a mere
contractual relationship made at arms length). He

is quoted as saying, "the artists and the record
companies are supposed to be allies and partners. It
is as if one spouse began secretly moving assets in
order to benefit him or herself to the detriment of
the other spouse."' 50 Record labels and their
recording artists have a special relationship that goes
beyond a simple contract when labels take on the
duty to control the collection and distribution of
royalties on behalf of artists. For example, the record
company has sole control over all sales and
accounting data)' Consequently, the artist has no
easily accessible and independent means to judge
whether or not the royalty statement is accurate or
if there isa breach.'52 While there is a right to audit,
it is an expensive and time consuming process and
in most contracts is severely limited so as to make
it incomplete at best.
Before a court will uphold a claim for a
breach of fiduciary duty, the party making the claim
must show specific conduct or circumstances which
implicate the necessary trust elements.5 3 Evidence
that special circumstances exist is necessary to
establish a fiduciary relationship exists between a

(I) A Relationship of Trust by
One Person in the Integrity of
Another
A fiduciary relationship is based on trust or
confidence by one person in the fidelity and integrity
of another.5 8 The origin of the confidence or trust
isimmaterial-the term is broad.5 9 The rule includes
both technical fiduciary relations and informal
relations (those that exist whenever one person
relies on and trusts in another). 6 ' A fiduciary

relationship,whether formal or informal, might exist
in appropriate circumstances such as between close
friends or where confidence is based on prior
6
business dealings.' '
In CBS, Inc. v.Ahern,

62

the court held that a

fiduciary duty existed between a major recording
company and a rock group. 63 The parties' agreement
stipulated the record company was to hold
previously earned royalties in special accounts for
the group's benefit. 64 The court held that when the
record company took the royalties for itself that it
had promised to hold for the artists, it had breached
a fiduciary duty to the
rock group with respect
to the monies. 6s Other
courts have found
existing fiduciary duties
in similar situations
where one party has had

,
artiss

recording company and a recording artist.5 4 Merely
making conclusory allegations that a fiduciary duty
is owed by a record label will not survive a motion
to dismiss in the context of artists and labels. 5 In
fact, in the past many claims by recording artists for
breach of fiduciary duty were unsuccessful because
they failed to allege any special circumstances
establishing a fiduciary duty outside of the basic
obligations of the contract.5 6 When determining
whether a fiduciary relationship exists, courts may
examine several factors, including: (I) the trust or
confidence existing between the parties, (2)
superiority, influence, or control by one party over
another as a result of the relationship, and (3) other
5 7
special facts indicating a need for special duties.

a duty to handle money
for another. 6 For
example, the defendant
in Irving Trust Co. v.
McKeever' 67was deemed

to be a fiduciary when he
agreed to invest money and property given over by
plaintiff.'68 Likewise, a court held that a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty was sufficiently
alleged in Teledyne Industries, Inc. v.Eon Corp, 69 where

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a duty to
place money in a special account in order to pay the
plaintiff. 70
171
InApple Records, Inc. v.Capitol Records,Inc.,
a dispute between the Beatles and their record
company, the court found a fiduciary relationship
existed.'72 The court based its finding on the
extensive business dealings between Capitol Records
and the Beatles.' 73 The Beatles entrusted their
musical talents to the label before they became
successful, and remained with the label after the

Beatles gained popularity.7 4 The court held that the
long and enduring relationship created a special
relationship of trust and confidence that existed
independent of the contract.' 75 The trust, the court
held, was betrayed by the label's committing fraud,
selling copies of the records that had allegedly been
scrapped, and giving away promotional copies of
Beatles' albums in order to benefit other aspects of
76

the label's business.1

(2) Superiority, Influence, Control, or Responsibility Over
Another
A fiduciary relationship arises when one has
reposed trust or confidence in the integrity or fidelity
of another who thereby gains a resulting superiority
or influence over the first, or when one assumes
control and responsibility over another.177 In Gordon
v. Bialystoker Center, 178 for example, the court held
that a fiduciary relationship existed between a plaintiff
and her caregiver because, in exchange for substantial
consideration, the defendant assumed complete
control, care, and responsibility for the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff was not expected to receive assistance
from any other source.

79

into signing a longer record deal with the label with
a cross-collateralization clause as a means of
recouping earlier debts.

(3) Other Special
Circumstances Involved in the
Recording Artist/Record
Company Relationship
In the dispute between the Beatles and their
record label, the court held that a fiduciary
relationship existed because the two parties had
continued their relationship through thick and thin
(that is, before the Beatles gained fame as well as
afterwards).8 0 This is probably true of almost any
artist/recording company relationship by the time
an artist has decided to file a lawsuit. Almost all
artists are signed by a record label before they gain
success, just as the Beatles were. In addition to the
existence of a continuing relationship, other factors
such as the parties' relative bargaining power and
the historical trend in the industry for labels to act
opportunistically in their royalty accounting and
distribution indicate that the label-artist relationship
might be one where imposition of fiduciary duties
might be appropriate in the context of royalty
accounting.

Similarly, when a record company and a
recording artist enter into an agreement, the record
company exercises control over the recording artist's
~
royalties. The recording artist no longer has any
control over the collection of his or her royalties
and must depend entirely on the recording company
to be responsible for accounting and distributing this
income. Also, because the record company has
The existence of a fiduciary relationship
exclusive control of the artist's services (and between artists and their labels will allow artists
therefore, the artist's
primary source of
income) the record
company is in control of
C~ h.

the artist's financial well-

t

being. This is particularly
evident in the context of
recoupables. The artist
stands the risk of being

indebted to the record
company for millions of
dollars if the record
company has not
allocated
royalty
incomes accurately. An
artist may be forced into
bankruptcy or forced

l

b
I

T. n

:lP

-
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more options and potentially a greater chance of
success when seeking recovery against record
companies. Where a fiduciary relationship exists,
breach of the duty can result in punitive damages or
even rescission of the contract. This increased
potential for liability will, in turn, create an incentive
for record labels to improve their accounting
practices. No longer will one artist achieve success
in the courtroom, just to have record labels resume
business as usual.
Inserting a fiduciary duty into the record
label-artist accounting relationship offers artists
several benefits to protect against bad accounting
practices. One alternative available to artists with
the recognition of a fiduciary relationship is the right
to an accounting. Once a party is deemed a fiduciary,
they are compelled to account for the property they
are exercising control over. 8 ' This means the party
who has granted control over his or her property is
entitled to an accounting. In Irving Trust Company v.
McKeever, the plaintiff had entrusted many of her
investments to the defendant, expecting him to buy
and sell in her best interests.' When he would not
return the investments to her, she had no way of
telling what was left or what she was entitled to as
damages.'83 The court granted her an accounting so
she could determine whether or not the defendant
had breached any of his obligations and whether she
was entitled to anything.'84 As discussed earlier, it
was often the case that artists were defeated in the
early stages of their case against a record label
because artists could not audit successfully and
therefore could not plead wrongdoings with
specificity.' Allowing for an accounting remedy will
enable artists to be fully informed of the royalties to
which they are entitled. If it is easier for artists to
check their record label's books, perhaps record
labels will decide to ensure they have accurate
systems, rather than face liability.
Another door that can open to an artist if
courts are willing to recognize a fiduciary duty is
the option of making a claim for conversion. In order
to establish a claim for conversion of money, the
plaintiff must establish that (I) there is an obligation
to treat specific money in a particular manner, and
(2) the money converted was done so by someone
who had a fiduciary duty in respect to it.8 6 Even if a
person is initially in rightful possession of property,
he may be liable for conversion if he refuses the
rightful owner's demand for the property.8 7 Using
this theory of liability, a record label may be liable

not only for any royalty payments wrongfully
withheld, but also punitive damages since it is a tort
action rather than an action under contract.
Another theory under which artists may be
able to recover unpaid royalties is an action to
impose a constructive trust based on a record
company's receipt of an artist's royalties. A claim to
establish a constructive trust must prove: (I) a
confidential or fiduciary relation; (2) a promise,
express or implied; (3) a transfer made in reliance
on that promise; and (4) unjust enrichment.'88 A claim
based on a constructive trust is not available unless
a fiduciary relationship exists.
Additionally, breach of a fiduciary duty by a
record label might allow an artist to seek a rescission
of the recording agreement. When a fiduciary
relationship exists between parties, transactions
between them are scrutinized with extreme vigilance,
and clear evidence is required that the transaction
was understood and that there was no fraud, mistake
or undue influence. Where those relations exist,
there must be clear proof of the integrity and fairness
of the transaction. 8 9 Otherwise the instrument
obtained will be set aside or held as invalid between
the parties. 9 ' Therefore, if an artist can prove that
he or she was fraudulently induced to enter into a
recording contract, a court might set the contract
aside.' 9' For example, an artist could claim that he
or she was induced to enter into an agreement by a
record company's representation that it would
render timely, accurate and honest accountings,
would pay all amounts due, and would permit the
artist to conduct meaningful audits to determine the
accuracy of its accountings.' 9 If the artist can show
the record company had no intention of following
through with these representations at the time it
made them, the record label's actions might
constitute fraud. 93 Fraud in the face of a fiduciary
duty--a duty separate from the duty to perform
under the contract-will entitle the artist to seek
special damages such as rescission of the contract.' 94

The artist-label relationship encompasses a
great deal more than the collection and allocation
of royalties. It would be impractical to define the
entire artist-label relationship as a fiduciary
relationship. In fact, it might be impossible to expect
a record company to maintain a general fiduciary

duty to any one artist because there are differing
artist priorities, conflicts with release dates, and
competition within the label for artists' releases in
different quarters. 95 As a result, it has been difficult
for artists to establish that a fiduciary duty exists
with their record company.
Courts applying NewYork law, for example,
have often refused to recognize a fiduciary
relationship between artists and recording
companies, or between parties in relationships similar
96
to those between artists and recording companies.'
Instead, these courts have characterized the
relationship between the parties as a purely
commercial, arms-length business transaction. 97 At
98
least one court applying California law is in accord.
9 the plaintiff assigned the
9
In Wolf v.Superior Court,
rights in his novel and the character on which the
novel was based to Walt Disney Pictures and
Television, while Disney agreed to pay the plaintiff

royalties. 00 The court held that the contractual right
to contingent compensation in the control of
another has never, by itself, been sufficient to create
a fiduciary relationship and affirmed dismissal of the
plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty claim.2 1
While courts in New York and California
slow to recognize the existence of a
been
have
fiduciary relationship between artists and record
labels, the legislature of California has recently been
moving in a different direction. Last year, as a
potential solution to the current inequity in royalty
accounting practices, California State Senator Kevin
Murray introduced legislation that would declare that

the record companies' obligation to accurately
account for royalties earned under a recording
02
The bill passed the full
contract is a fiduciary duty.1

California Senate, but was withdrawn before it could
3 At the time of
be voted on by the Assembly.20
publication, Senator Murray has plans to reintroduce
the bill in 2004.2o
I.

oncusion

After resolving the year-long dispute with
Sony, Recording Artist Coalition member and
manager of the Dixie Chicks, Simon Renshaw,
declared,"[c]hange isinevitable... Once people have
a true understanding of what's involved, the labels
will be forced to reform." 205 Unless the change comes

that he and other supporters of the Artist Rights
Movement hope for, artists will continue to enter
into agreements that
favor record companies
and continue to tolerate
industry accounting
practices that many
believe consistently take
advantage of artists.
Without change, the
best an underpaid artist
can hope for is to incur
the expenses of a limited
audit and litigation, only
to receive at most
something close to what
they were entitled to in
the first place.
added
The
that
liability
potential
comes with recognizing
a fiduciary relationship between artists and record
labels in the context of royalty accounting will serve
as an incentive for labels to take the steps necessary
to ensure their royalty accounting practices are
accurate and transparent. Otherwise, labels may be
liable for punitive damages and may even stand to
lose valuable artists who could ask a court to rescind
the recording agreement. In fact, even the threat of
legislation, which would impose a fiduciary duty on
recording companies, has inspired some labels to
change their ways. Executives at Warner Music
Group, for example, told legislators in California that
they intend to make changes in their accounting

practices that will put "teeth" in their recent

Id.

17

commitment to report accurate royalties.2 06 Warner

proposes to simplify royalty calculations and make
it easier for acts to determine what they are owed.27
Among the changesWarner executives discussed are
eliminating outdated royalty deductions like the
"container" deduction, allowing auditors access to
all manufacturing documents, paying interest at prime
rates to artists on unpaid royalties found in an audit,
and even reimbursing acts for costs of any audit that
reveals under-crediting of royalties exceeding ten
percent.2 These are positive changes. If courts begin
to recognize a fiduciary relationship in the context
of royalty accounting, or state legislatures impose a
similar fiduciary duty, other major record companies
will followWarner's lead and make significant changes
in the way they allocate royalties to their artists.
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